A power struggle in Iran could decide when Trump’s war ends

Inside Tehran’s Fracture: Two Visions of Victory Collide as Iran’s Supreme Leader Stays Hidden

Activelifezero.com – The Islamic Republic of Iran is split down the middle over a question that has haunted its leadership since the revolution of 1979: when does a war become a negotiation? After six months of sustained conflict with the United States and Israel, the answer remains unresolved, and the man who holds final authority over it — Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei — has not been seen publicly. In his absence, two camps within Tehran’s power structure are pulling the country in opposite directions, each convinced that the other will doom the state.

A Ghost from the Iran-Iraq War Haunts Today’s Calculus

The ideological roots of today’s standoff stretch back more than four decades. In the early stages of the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, after months of costly setbacks, thousands of young Iranian soldiers launched a surprise offensive that reversed the battlefield momentum. The then-supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, did not settle for holding ground. He ordered a push toward Baghdad itself, aiming to overthrow the Iraqi dictator — who was receiving growing backing from Washington — and to send a message to every future adversary that war with Iran would carry an unbearable price. That decision transformed what might have been a short campaign into a six-year war of attrition that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, making it one of the deadliest conflicts in the region’s modern history.

For the revolutionary guard and hardline clerics who still occupy the most powerful seats in Tehran, the lesson of that era is unambiguous: wars imposed from outside are won not by superior firepower but by sheer endurance. They view the current US-Israeli conflict through exactly that lens. On the opposite side of the political spectrum, a more moderate grouping sees an opening to lock in whatever gains Iran has secured through months of stalled negotiations, arguing that continued confrontation only deepens economic ruin without altering the strategic balance.

The Pragmatists: Close the File While Strength Remains

President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi form the core of the camp urging a definitive settlement. Their argument rests on material reality: an economy battered by years of sanctions and now further strained by active hostilities, a punishing US naval blockade choking trade routes, and visible damage to domestic infrastructure. They have warned publicly that the narrow window for concluding the conflict from a position of relative strength is narrowing with each passing week.

These officials speak for a segment of the Iranian public that views ending the 47-year confrontation with Washington as the most reliable path to alleviating domestic crises and breaking the country’s global isolation. Pezeshkian made the case explicitly this month:

“The war must end at some point. It would be better to end it today, while we are in a position of strength and dignity, and the entire world acknowledges our victory.”

The Hardliners: Endurance Is the Only Currency

The conservative bloc’s worldview is built on a half-century of suspicion toward Washington, which they regard as determined to dismantle the Islamic Republic. Trump’s decision to wage war has, in their telling, vindicated decades of warnings that moderate opponents dismissed as paranoia. They further accuse current officeholders of being “Western-oriented” and of manufacturing public anxiety over economic hardship to steer opinion toward capitulation.

Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa program at London’s Chatham House think tank, explained the psychology driving this faction:

“They see the US as a deeply untrustworthy actor… and (have) been burnt so many times by Trump himself that they think that this is exactly what will happen again. In their minds, by not losing (the war), they’ve won, and they’re not just trying to win out with a better deal from Washington, but they’re looking for internal longevity in their competition with their opponents.”

The hardliners point to historical precedent as proof that American commitments are hollow: the 2015 nuclear deal negotiated under the Obama administration, which Trump subsequently abandoned, and two separate instances in which US forces struck Iranian targets while negotiations were still underway. Their strategy, in essence, is to outlast the American appetite for conflict, betting that the Islamic Republic’s institutional endurance will outpace Washington’s political will.

Personal Rivalry Sharpened by Tragedy

The split is not purely ideological. Pezeshkian assumed the presidency under unusual circumstances, stepping into office after his hardline predecessor perished in a helicopter crash. That accidental ascent has made him, in the eyes of the conservative establishment, a weak figure who lacks revolutionary legitimacy. His signature alongside Trump’s on the June ceasefire agreement has only deepened their contempt, fueling a sustained campaign to hold him personally responsible for the shattered economy and the failure to extract concessions from Washington.

Accusations have grown more extreme. Some hardline figures allege that the government has deliberately engineered fuel shortages to make a negotiated settlement feel unavoidable to an exhausted population. Others go further still, suggesting that moderates are staging a coup to force their hand. Hardline lawmaker Mohammad-Manan Raisi put the skepticism bluntly:

“Economically, are we really in a dead end, or are you just projecting a dead end? It has all been blamed on the war, while it is not all related to the war.”

What Stakes Decide the Outcome

With the Supreme Leader absent from public view, the final arbiter between these two visions of victory remains unclear. The pragmatists argue that every additional month of blockade and bombardment erodes the very strength they claim to possess. The hardliners counter that conceding now would confirm the American thesis that Iran can be broken by pressure, repeating the pattern they believe has played out repeatedly since 1979. What both camps share is a conviction, inherited from Khomeini’s era, that the outcome of an imposed war is determined not by which side fields more weapons but by which side refuses to blink first. The question now is whether Tehran’s leadership can sustain that refusal long enough to make it matter — or whether the economic and human costs will force a reckoning before any strategic calculation can be completed.