Bowen: Trump has called for an Iran uprising but the lessons from Iraq in 1991 loom large
Bowen: Trump has called for an Iran uprising but the lessons from Iraq in 1991 loom large
Years after the 1991 Gulf War, the echoes of a presidential call to action still resonate. The author, having witnessed the fallout of such a move, now reflects on how Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu are urging Iranians to seize the opportunity to topple their government, mirroring the strategy that once unfolded in Baghdad. This parallel is stark, given the aftermath of the first Gulf War, where the absence of immediate support led to unintended consequences.
In February 1991, President George H.W. Bush addressed workers at a Patriot missile factory in Massachusetts. The advanced weapon was newly deployed in the Gulf War, part of the Desert Storm operation that had already begun driving Iraqi forces from Kuwait. At the time, the U.S., U.K., and their allies were bombing Iraqi troops and cities, while ground forces massed on the borders, ready to strike nine days later. The author was in Baghdad, documenting the conflict, when Bush’s speech took place.
“There’s another way for the bloodshed to stop… and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside…”
Bush’s words, though brief, carried weight. They were meant to bolster morale, yet they inadvertently ignited hope among Iraqis. After the war, a ceasefire allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power. This led to uprisings in the north and south, where Kurds and Shias fought against his regime. The coalition forces, including the U.S. and Britain, did not intervene, leaving the Iraqi military to retaliate with brutal force. Thousands perished, and the author saw firsthand the grief of families mourning their children, many buried in snowy mountainsides.
Years later, the same pattern reemerges. Trump and Netanyahu are presenting Iran with a chance to overthrow its government, yet no guarantees of direct military backing are offered. The author recalls how, in 1991, the absence of support for the uprising in Iraq allowed Saddam to survive, despite the war’s toll. The consequences of that decision lingered, shaping policies like the no-fly zone and establishing permanent U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia. It was during this period that Osama bin Laden, embittered by foreign presence, began forming Al Qaeda.
By 2003, the second Bush administration had taken the next step, ousting Saddam Hussein and completing what the author sees as his father’s mission. Iran, once an adversary, emerged as a regional power, while Israel viewed its nuclear ambitions as a threat. Now, the third Gulf War seeks to reverse that trend, with bombing campaigns targeting Iran’s military and nuclear programs. Yet, the author warns, history may repeat itself if the U.S. fails to commit fully to the uprising.
